Classical Indian Epistemology and Metaphysics Questions and Answers

Answer: D

The Samkhya theory of causation, satkaryavada, is based on the principle that the effect pre-exists in the cause. Oil is in the seed and the pot is in the clay, so production is only the manifestation of what was already there in latent form. 'Not related with the cause', 'does not pre-exist' and 'produced out of nothing' are the opposite view, asatkaryavada, held by Nyaya and Vaisesika. The answer is that the effect pre-exists in the cause. Samkhya argues this because only a cause that already contains the effect can produce it, as only sesame seeds can yield oil and a given material can yield only a given product.

Answer: B

To Patanjali, Sasmita is a kind of Samadhi. In the Yoga Sutras the samprajnata samadhi, the cognitive concentration, has four stages: vitarka, vichara, ananda and asmita, where the mind is absorbed in the sense of the self alone. It is not a kind of Yoga in the sense of the whole path, nor of asana (posture) or pranayama (breath control), which are limbs of the eightfold path. The answer is Samadhi. The four forms of samprajnata samadhi are written in the Samadhi Pada of the Yoga Sutras, in sutra 1.17, which names vitarka, vicara, ananda and asmita.

Answer: B

The official key gives Logic as the support of the theory of causation proposed by Sankaradvaita. Sankara's theory is that the effect is non-different from the cause, and the effect is only an appearance, vivarta, of Brahman. He argues for this by reasoning in his commentary on the Brahmasutra, while also citing the scriptural example of clay and pots from the Chandogya Upanisad, so 'All the above' is arguable; the key, though, names logic. The answer follows the key: Logic.

Answer: D

The theory that the effect is only the apparent result of the cause is Vivarta-vada, the Advaita view that the world is an appearance superimposed on Brahman, like a snake seen in a rope. Satkaryavada says the effect pre-exists in the cause, asatkaryavada that it is a new beginning, and parinamavada that the cause really transforms into the effect, as milk becomes curd. Only vivarta makes the effect merely apparent. The answer is Vivarta vada. In the standard example a rope is mistaken for a snake: the snake is an appearance and the rope is unchanged, which shows what vivarta means.

Answer: C

The view that cit (conscious souls) and acit (unconscious matter) are two parts of Brahman is held by Rāmānuja, option C. In his Viśiṣṭādvaita, Brahman is the one whole, qualified by souls and matter, which are its inseparable body and attributes and are real.

Śaṅkara (option A) teaches a non-dual, attributeless Brahman, in which no real parts or attributes exist. Madhva (option B) holds a real, eternal difference between God, souls and matter, so he does not make them parts of Brahman. Jaimini (option D) is the founder of the Mimāṃsā school and is not concerned with this account of Brahman.

Answer: B

The cause between a cloth and its threads is the samavāyi (inherent or material) cause, option B. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika a samavāyi kāraṇa is the cause in which the effect inheres, and the cloth inheres in the threads, so the threads are its samavāyi cause.

The asamavāyi cause (option A) is the conjunction of the threads, which is a cause of the cloth but is one that inheres in the same substrate as the effect and not the substance itself. The nimitta, or efficient cause (option D), is the weaver with his loom. Option C, both, is not the intended single answer, since the question asks for the kind of cause that the threads are.

Answer: B

The relation between the self and the mind is saṁyoga, contact or conjunction, option B. In Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika both ātman and manas are substances, and the relation between two substances is conjunction, which is what links the self with the mind in cognition.

Samavāya (option A) is inherence, the relation between things that cannot exist apart, such as a quality and its substance, or a whole and its parts, and it cannot hold between two independent substances. Svarūpa (option C) is the self-linking relation by which absences and similar things are related, and not the link between two substances. Option D is wrong since conjunction is the right answer.

Answer: C

The one that is not an eternal substance is the sāvayava, option C. A thing that has parts (sāvayava) is a composite, and a composite can be produced and destroyed, so it is not eternal. In Vaiśeṣika the eternal substances are the partless ones: ākāsa, kāla, dik, ātman, manas and the atoms.

Ākāsa (option A) is eternal, and so is kāla, time (option B). Niravayava (option D), the partless, is itself the mark of an eternal thing. The question therefore asks for the only option that describes a composite and not an eternal substance.

Answer: B

The reality that is not refuted is the Pāramārthika, option B. In Advaita Vedānta the Pāramārthika sattā, the absolute reality, belongs to Brahman alone, and no later experience contradicts or sublates it.

The Vyāvahārika sattā, the empirical reality of the world of everyday dealings (option A), is real for ordinary life but is sublated by the knowledge of Brahman, and so it is refuted at the highest level. Options C and D are wrong because they either include the empirical level or deny the absolute one. Only the absolute reality is never sublated.

Answer: B

The basis of Śaṅkara's philosophy of self is non-dualism, option B. In his Advaita Vedānta the individual self is in reality identical with Brahman, the one reality without a second, and the apparent difference is a product of ignorance.

Dualism (option A) is the view of Madhva and of the Sāṃkhya. Qualified monism (option C) is Rāmānuja's Viśiṣṭādvaita, which keeps real differences within Brahman. Pluralism (option D) is the view of many real independent substances, as in Jainism or Vaiśeṣika, and is opposed to Śaṅkara's position.