Classical Indian Epistemology and Metaphysics Questions and Answers

Answer: C

Goutama, that is Gautama, the author of the Nyaya Sutra, does not refute perception; he accepts it as the first and the most basic means of valid knowledge (pramana). Jayarashi Bhatta, the Carvaka author of the Tattvopaplavasimha, doubted all pramanas including perception, Sri Harsha in the Khandanakhandakhadya attacked the definitions of the pramanas on Advaita grounds, and Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka dialectic rejected the pramanas. The answer is Goutama. Nyaya's own definition of perception in the first aphorisms is a cognition produced by the contact of sense and object, which shows that Goutama places perception first among the four pramanas. The three others each belong to a thinker who attacked the means of knowledge, which is why they are the options that fail the test.

Answer: D

Pratityasamutpada, dependent origination, means that whatever originates does so on some conditions: every phenomenon arises in dependence on causes and conditions, as in the formula 'when this is, that comes to be'. 'There is no permanent self' states the doctrine of anatman, a consequence of dependent origination but not its definition. 'Whatever is, is momentary' is the doctrine of momentariness, kshanikavada, and 'no origination of some elements' contradicts the doctrine. The answer is that whatever originates, originates on some conditions.

Answer: D

The official key says that liberation according to Jainism is all of the above. In Jainism moksha is the complete freedom of the soul from karmic matter, which ends the cycle of birth and death. So it is freedom from life and death, freedom from karma and freedom from matter, since karma is subtle matter bound to the soul; none of the three is wrong, and each alone is incomplete because of the word 'only'. The answer is All the above, following the key.

Answer: C

Jainism distinguishes two aspects of liberation: Bhava-Moksa, the state of the soul when the passions and karmic dispositions are removed, and Dravya-Moksa, the actual separation of the soul from karmic matter at the end. Liberation is therefore termed by both, and the two stages are not alternatives. Taking only one of them leaves the other out, and 'Neither' is false. The answer is Bhava Moksa and Dravya Moksa both.

Answer: A

The consistent set is Sunyavada with Chandrakirti. Sunyavada is the Madhyamaka doctrine of emptiness, and Chandrakirti is one of its leading commentators, in the Prasannapada. Nirguna is the Advaita idea of Brahman without attributes, whereas Ramanuja held that Brahman has attributes, so that pair is inconsistent. Satkaryavada is the Samkhya view, not that of Goutama, who held asatkaryavada, and Karmavada is not Charvaka, since the Charvakas denied karma. The answer is Sunyavada with Chandrakirti.

Answer: C

The view that all perception is nirvikalpaka, free of conceptual construction, is upheld by the Buddhists (Bauddha); in their view perception gives the bare particular, and concepts are added by the mind. Nyaya and Vaisesika accept both nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka perception, and Visistadvaita accepts both as well. The answer is Bauddha. Nyaya allows savikalpaka perception that grasps a thing with its qualifiers, Vaisesika agrees, and Visistadvaita holds that all perception is determinate, so none of these three accepts the claim that every perception lacks concepts.

Answer: D

The official key gives Jiva and Brahman as the relation of prapatti, surrender. In Visistadvaita prapatti is the complete self-surrender of the individual soul to God, who is Brahman, also called Isvara or Narayana. Since the Lord of Ramanuja's system is Brahman, option C (Jiva and Isvara) names much the same relation, but the key prefers the pair Jiva and Brahman. Jiva and Jagat, and Brahma and Jagat, name the world and not the surrender. The answer is Jiva and Brahman, following the key.

Answer: C

According to the Vaisesika school the universal 'Cowness' is eternal, one and residing in many. A universal (samanya or jati) is a single eternal entity that inheres in all the individual members of a class, so cowness is one although it is found in many cows, and it does not perish with them. 'Non-eternal' wrongly makes it perishable, and 'many' wrongly makes there several cownesses. The answer is Eternal, one and residing in many. The same view applies to other universals: potness is one and eternal and resides in all pots, even those not yet made.

Answer: A

The unique contribution of Mimamsa to the sources of knowledge is Anupalabdhi, non-apprehension, accepted by the Bhatta school of Kumarila as a separate means of knowing the absence of a thing. Inference and testimony are accepted by many schools and comparison (upamana) by Nyaya, so they are not unique to Mimamsa. The answer is Anupalabdhi. Kumarila's school uses it to know that a jar is absent from a place, which perception of the empty place alone does not give.

Answer: C

Mimamsa accepts the view that validity is intrinsic and invalidity is extrinsic: Svatah-pramanya, Paratah-apramanya. The truth of a cognition is known from the same conditions that produce it, while its falsity is known only when a defect or a contradicting cognition is found. Nyaya holds that both validity and invalidity are extrinsic, Samkhya that both are intrinsic, and the Buddhists that invalidity is intrinsic and validity extrinsic. The answer is option C, Svatah-pramanya, Paratah-apramanya.