Classical Indian Epistemology and Metaphysics Questions and Answers

Answer: C

Anyathakhyativada is upheld by Nyaya and Vaisesika, so the answer is C.

On this view error is the perception of a thing as something other than what it is (anyatha): in the case of nacre seen as silver, the silver is real elsewhere, and is wrongly attributed to the shell that is in front of the eyes.

Samkhya and Yoga (A) hold sadasatkhyati, and the Mimamsa and Buddhist views (B) are akhyati and atmakhyati respectively. Ramanuja holds satkhyati, so D is wrong.

Answer: A

The correct set of schools that deny sabda as a separate means of knowledge is Carvaka, Bauddha and Vaisesika, so the answer is A.

The Carvaka accepts perception alone. The Buddhist logicians accept perception and inference and treat verbal testimony as a kind of inference, and the Vaisesika likewise includes testimony in inference. None of them admits sabda as an independent pramana.

The Samkhya (B) and the Nyaya and Advaita Vedanta (C) all accept sabda, as does option D through the Nyaya, so each of those sets contains a school that does not deny it.

Answer: B

The theory of error called akhyativada is presented by the Mimamsa (the Prabhakara school), so the answer is B.

Akhyati means 'non-apprehension'. According to it, error arises because two cognitions, the perception of what is before the eyes and the memory of the thing that is remembered, are not distinguished, so the error is a lack of discrimination and not a positive false cognition.

Advaita Vedanta (A) holds anirvacaniyakhyati, in which the object of illusion is indefinable as real or unreal, Samkhya (C) holds sadasatkhyati, and Nyaya (D) holds anyathakhyati, so none of these presents akhyativada.

Answer: A

The identity of the subject and object consciousness, which takes the form of the external object, is perception, so the answer is A.

In the Advaita Vedanta account, the inner organ goes out through a sense organ to the object and takes on its shape. When the cognition (vrtti) and the object consciousness limited by the object become one with the subject consciousness, the object is directly known. This identity of the three is the definition of perception.

Inference (B), scriptural testimony (C) and analogy (D) all work through a mark, words or a likeness and not by this direct identity of the knower and the known object.

Answer: B

The key gives Naya as the most important element in the Jaina theory of knowledge, so the answer is B.

The Jaina holds that reality has infinitely many aspects (anekantavada). A single judgement can grasp only one aspect, and naya is the standpoint, the partial view that expresses one aspect, which is a mark of the Jaina theory of knowledge alongside pramana, the full knowledge of the thing. Naya and syadvada are the characteristic Jaina contributions to epistemology and logic.

Perception (A), scripture (C) and inference (D) are all recognised sources of knowledge, but they are shared with other systems, so the distinctively important element named in the key is naya.

Answer: C

The fundamental aim of Patanjali's Yoga is the cessation of the modifications of the mind, so the answer is C.

The second aphorism of the Yogasutra defines yoga as the stopping of the fluctuations of the mind (citta-vrtti-nirodha). When they cease, the seer rests in its own nature, and this is the isolation (kaivalya) of the self from nature.

Union with God (A) and union with the self (B) are the aims of other schools or of the later bhakti and Vedanta traditions. Patanjali treats devotion to God (Isvarapranidhana) only as one means of reaching the goal, and the acquisition of powers (D) is a by-product that he warns against.

Answer: C

The third type of inference in Gautama's classification is samanyatodrsta, so the answer is C.

The Nyayasutra divides inference into purvavat (from cause to effect), sesavat (from effect to cause) and samanyatodrsta (inference of an imperceptible thing from a general correspondence, as when one infers that the sun moves because its place changes, as with other things that move).

Anvayi and vyatireki (A, B) belong to a later classification of inference by the form of the invariable concomitance, that is, by positive or negative concomitance, so they are not the third kind in Gautama's list.

Answer: D

Vyapti, the invariable concomitance between two things, can be attained by all of the above, so the answer is D.

Observation of many cases of the two together without any exception (bhuyodarsana) is the base. Tarka, the reasoning that shows the absurdity of the contrary, removes the doubt that some exception may exist. Samanyalaksana pratyaksa, the perception through the universal, lets the mind apprehend the relation as holding in all cases of the two classes.

Each of the three is a stage in the Nyaya account of how vyapti is known, so choosing only one (A, B or C) leaves the process incomplete.

Answer: C

If pratyaksa is defined as jnana, the definition commits the fallacy of ativyapti, so the answer is C.

A definition commits ativyapti (over-extension) when it covers more than the thing defined. Jnana, knowledge, includes inference, comparison and testimony as well as perception, so a definition of perception as knowledge applies to cases that are not perception.

Avyapti (D) is the opposite, a definition that covers too little. Viruddha (A) and sankarya (B) are not the names of these defects of definition in this sense.

Answer: B

In Buddhist epistemology, kalpana means imaginary construction, so the answer is B.

Dignaga and Dharmakirti define perception as free from kalpana: it is the bare sensation of the unique particular, and it is non-conceptual. Kalpana is the conceptual construction, the association of a name or a class with what is given, and it is the work of the mind, not something present in the object.

It is therefore not a real construction (A), and it cannot be both (C). The answer is the official one.