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What changes in the repeated prisoner's dilemma?

  • A.Randomised strategies become necessary for the first time
  • B.Cooperation can be sustained by the threat of future punishment
  • C.The payoffs of the individual game are altered by the repetition
  • D.The game becomes zero sum after sufficiently many rounds

Answer: B

With an indefinite number of future rounds, a strategy that punishes defection can make cooperation the better long run choice, which is why tit for tat performs so well. The stage payoffs are unchanged, the game remains non zero sum, and randomisation is not required. That a game's character changes entirely when it is repeated, without any change to its payoffs, is one of the more consequential results in the field.

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