General Exceptions Questions and Answers

Answer: C

The passage is the text of Section 80 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, on accident in doing a lawful act: nothing is an offence which is done by accident or misfortune, without any criminal intention or knowledge, in the doing of a lawful act in a lawful manner by lawful means and with proper care and caution.

Sections 85 and 87 are general exceptions in other categories, intoxication against his will and an act not intended and not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, done by consent, respectively, and Section 88 deals with an act not intended to cause death, done by consent in good faith for a person's benefit. None of them is the accident exception.

Answer: A

The McNaughten rule is embodied in Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code.

The rule comes from Daniel M'Naghten's case of 1843 in England: a person is not responsible for an act if, at the time, owing to unsoundness of mind, he did not know the nature of the act or that it was wrong. Section 84 IPC enacts the same test: nothing is an offence which is done by a person who, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that it is wrong or contrary to law.

Sections 85 and 86 deal with intoxication (involuntary and voluntary), and Section 87 with acts done by consent not intended to cause death or grievous hurt.

Answer: D

The motive should be either (A) or (B): the prevention of harm to person or to property.

Section 81 of the Indian Penal Code (act likely to cause harm, but done without criminal intent, and to prevent other harm) protects an act done in good faith 'for the purpose of preventing or avoiding other harm to person or property'. The section uses 'or', so it is enough that the purpose was to prevent harm to a person or to prevent harm to property.

Requiring both together would narrow the section beyond its words, and either one alone is only one of the two purposes it allows.

Answer: A

Doli incapax applies to a person who is below seven years of age.

Section 82 of the IPC provides that nothing is an offence which is done by a child under seven years of age. The presumption that such a child is incapable of crime (doli incapax) is absolute and cannot be rebutted.

For children between seven and twelve, Section 83 gives only a qualified immunity: the child is not liable if he had not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge the nature and consequences of his conduct. Sixteen and eighteen are ages relevant under juvenile justice law, not doli incapax.

Answer: D

The key's answer is insanity caused an act, that is, an act done because of unsoundness of mind.

Section 84 IPC excuses an act done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or that it is wrong or contrary to law. The defence is cognitive, following the M'Naghten rules: the insanity must cause the incapacity under which the act is done.

Uncontrollable impulse, irresistible impulse and impulsive insanity describe a person who knows what he is doing and that it is wrong but cannot resist. Indian courts have consistently held that such volitional impulses do not fall within Section 84.

Answer: A

The word is accident.

An accident is something that happens by chance, unexpectedly and without design. Section 80 IPC excuses an act done by accident or misfortune, without criminal intention or knowledge, in doing a lawful act in a lawful manner with proper care.

Negligence, rashness and recklessness all involve fault: failing to take care, or knowingly running a risk. None carries the sense of a fortuitous, unforeseen event.

Answer: B

Sections 87 to 93 rest on volenti non fit injuria (printed 'Volunti').

These sections deal with acts done with consent: an act not intended to cause death or grievous hurt done with the consent of a person above eighteen (Section 87), acts done in good faith for a person's benefit with consent (Sections 88 and 89), and related cases. The underlying maxim is that harm suffered by one who consents is no wrong.

Ignorantia juris non excusat (ignorance of law is no excuse) underlies the rule on mistake of law, de minimis non curat lex underlies Section 95 on trivial acts, and actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea states the general requirement of a guilty mind.

Answer: A

The answer is more than 7 years if he is able to understand the facts and circumstances.

The BNS keeps the old rule of doli incapax. Under section 20, nothing done by a child under seven is an offence: below that age there is no criminal responsibility at all. Under section 21, a child above seven and under twelve is not liable if he has not attained sufficient maturity of understanding to judge the nature and consequences of his conduct. So responsibility can begin only above seven, and then only if the child understands what he is doing.

12 years is the age above which the maturity test no longer applies, not the minimum. 10 and 14 are minimum ages used in other countries' laws, not in the BNS.

Answer: C

The one that is not a general exception is Act done under provocation.

The general exceptions (Chapter III of the BNS) apply to all offences. They include acts of a person of unsound mind (Section 22), acts done in good faith for a person's benefit or with consent, and acts done under compulsion by threats (Section 32), which is the defence of duress.

Grave and sudden provocation is not a general exception. It is a specific exception to murder (Exception 1 to Section 101), which only reduces murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder.

Answer: A

The correct statement is option A: if the harm to be prevented was so imminent as to excuse A's act, A will not be guilty.

This is an illustration to the general exception of necessity, Section 19 of the BNS: nothing is an offence merely because it is done with knowledge that it is likely to cause harm, if it is done without criminal intention, in good faith, to prevent or avoid other harm to person or property. Whether the harm prevented was serious and imminent enough to justify the act is a question of fact.

A is therefore not punishable merely because he damaged property, and his act is excused rather than punished with a mitigated sentence.