Joint and Constructive Liability Questions and Answers

Answer: B

The element that does not belong to Section 34 is 'the criminal act must be furtherance of common object'.

Section 34 of the IPC makes several persons jointly liable when a criminal act is done by them in furtherance of the common intention of all. Its ingredients are a criminal act done by several persons, a common intention shared by all, and participation by each in furthering it.

'Common object' is the language of Section 149, which makes every member of an unlawful assembly liable for an offence committed in prosecution of the assembly's common object. Common object does not require the prior meeting of minds that common intention does, and Section 149 needs five or more persons, so the two must not be confused.

Answer: D

Each person is liable as if the whole act were done by him alone.

Section 34 IPC provides that when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of them is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone. It is a rule of joint liability: if a common intention to kill is shown, each participant is liable for murder, even if another struck the fatal blow.

Liability is not confined to the part each personally did. Abetment and conspiracy are separate offences under Chapters V and V-A, not the effect of section 34.

Answer: D

The answer is All of the above.

Each statement is a recognised distinction between Section 34 (common intention) and Section 149 (common object of an unlawful assembly):

• Section 149 needs a common object of the kinds listed in Section 141, whereas the common intention under Section 34 may be of any kind.
• Section 34 requires some participation in the act, however small, whereas under Section 149 mere membership of the assembly at the time is enough.
• Section 34 creates no offence but lays down a rule of joint liability, while Section 149 creates a specific offence.

Since the first three are all correct distinctions, choosing any one of them alone is incomplete.

Answer: B

The correct match is (a)-(4), (b)-(3), (c)-(1), (d)-(2).

• Common object is the basis of constructive liability under Section 149 IPC: every member of an unlawful assembly is guilty of an offence committed in prosecution of its common object.
• Common intention is the basis of joint liability under Section 34.
• Instigation is the first form of abetment under Section 107.
• Dishonest intention is the mental element of theft under Section 378.

Each other code misplaces at least two items, for example pairing common object with abetment, or instigation with theft.

Answer: A

This describes the criminal act in Section 34 of the IPC.

In Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor (1925) the Privy Council explained that the 'criminal act' in Section 34 means the whole unity of criminal behaviour, the bundle of acts by several persons tied together by their common intention, which results in the offence. Each person who shares the common intention is liable as if he had done the whole act.

Section 149 rests on a common object of an unlawful assembly, not a common intention, and Section 141 only defines an unlawful assembly. So neither they nor 'both (A) and (B)' fits the description.

Answer: B

The keyed answer is (B): P and L are both liable for common intention. P held the victim and urged L to strike, so he took part in the act, and L inflicted the fatal wound with the kirpan. Under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, when a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each is liable as if he had done it alone. P's holding and exhorting show a shared intention. Statement (i) does not say on what basis P is liable. Statement (iii), common object, belongs to unlawful assembly under Section 149, which needs five or more persons. Statement (iv) ignores P's participation.

Answer: B

The key accepts ‘d’. Common intention under Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code is seldom proved by direct evidence and is inferred from the totality of the circumstances in which the act was committed, which is the broadest and decisive basis. Pre-arranged plan and prior concert are the facts from which it is inferred, but a period anterior in time among the offenders, reason ‘a’, is not a basis, because the intention can be formed on the spot. The options that rest on ‘a’ as support are not the key’s choice, and ‘d’ is the one asserted as true.