Classical Indian Epistemology and Metaphysics Questions and Answers

Answer: A

Mayavada is criticised on seven grounds by Ramanuja.

In the Sri Bhashya, Ramanuja sets out the seven untenabilities (saptavidha anupapatti) of Shankara's doctrine of maya or avidya: about its locus (ashraya), its nature (tirodhana, concealment), its essential character (svarupa), its indescribability (anirvachaniyatva), the means of knowing it (pramana), its removal by knowledge (nivartaka) and its cessation (nivritti).

Vallabha, Madhva and Nimbarka also rejected Mayavada, but the classic critique on seven counts is Ramanuja's.

Answer: D

Saccidananda is the essential nature of Brahman.

Advaita distinguishes two kinds of definition. Tatastha lakshana, the accidental definition, describes Brahman as the cause of the world, which is true only from the empirical standpoint. Svarupa lakshana, the essential definition, states what Brahman is in itself: sat (existence), cit (consciousness) and ananda (bliss).

So saccidananda is not a mere description or a main feature among others, and it is not a negative characterization like 'neti neti'; it is Brahman's own nature, positively stated.

Answer: B

The one not maintained by Samkara is Anekantika.

Shankara distinguishes three levels of reality: paramarthika, the absolute reality of Brahman; vyavaharika, the empirical reality of the everyday world; and pratibhasika, the apparent reality of illusions and dreams, such as the snake seen in a rope.

Anekanta, 'non-one-sidedness', is the Jaina doctrine that reality has many aspects and can be described from many standpoints. Shankara rejects it in the Brahma Sutra Bhashya, arguing that contradictory attributes cannot belong to the same thing at once.

Answer: B

According to Ramanuja, the world-process is the outcome of Trivrtkarana.

The Chandogya Upanishad (6.3) describes creation as the tripartition (trivrtkarana) of fire, water and earth, each element mixed with portions of the other two. Ramanuja accepts this Upanishadic account of how the world of names and forms arises from the subtle elements.

Pancikarana, the quintupling of five elements, is the account taught in the later Advaita tradition. Aprthaksiddhi is the inseparable relation between Brahman and the world as its body, which explains their unity but is not the process of creation. Brahman is the ultimate cause, but the question asks for the process, which is trivrtkarana.

Answer: A

The Vaiśeṣika accepts anyathākhyāti.

Khyātivāda is the theory of error, explaining what is cognised when, say, a shell is seen as silver. Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika hold anyathākhyāti, 'apprehension otherwise': a real silver seen elsewhere is presented, through a defect, as if it were here, so error is misplacement of something real.

Akhyāti, non-apprehension of the difference between two cognitions, is Prabhākara Mīmāṃsā's theory. Ātmakhyāti, where the mind projects its own idea outward, belongs to the Yogācāra Buddhists, and asatkhyāti, apprehension of the non-existent, to the Mādhyamikas.

Answer: A

The match is i-d, ii-b, iii-c, iv-a.

Śaṅkarācārya's Advaita holds that ultimate reality is unqualified (nirguṇa) Brahman. Madhvācārya (printed 'Madhavacarya') taught Dvaita, the fivefold difference between God, souls and matter. Rāmānujācārya's Viśiṣṭādvaita treats souls and matter as the body and attributes of God. Nimbārkācārya taught Dvaitādvaita, identity-in-difference (bhedābheda).

The other codes give Śaṅkara a qualified God or put Madhva with identity-in-difference, which reverses his strict dualism.

Answer: B

The Mīmāṃsakas hold svataḥ prāmāṇyavāda and parataḥ aprāmāṇyavāda.

For the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, a cognition is valid by itself: the conditions that produce knowledge also make it valid, and we accept it at once. Invalidity is known from outside, when a later contradicting cognition or a defect in the cause is discovered. This underpins their view that the Veda is self-valid.

Nyāya holds both validity and invalidity to be extrinsic (parataḥ). Sāṃkhya holds both intrinsic, and the Buddhists are usually said to hold invalidity intrinsic and validity extrinsic, the reverse of the Mīmāṃsā.

Answer: D

The incorrect statement is that kevala implies non-distinction of prakṛti and puruṣa.

In Sāṃkhya, bondage arises from failing to distinguish puruṣa, pure consciousness, from prakṛti and its products. Liberation (kaivalya) comes through viveka-jñāna, the discriminating knowledge of their difference; it is the isolation of puruṣa, the very opposite of non-distinction.

The other statements are Sāṃkhya teaching: all experience is infected with threefold suffering, suffering lasts while puruṣa is associated with citta, and in kaivalya the impressions (saṃskāras) and ignorance are destroyed.

Answer: A

The answer is that both (A) and (R) are true and (R) is the correct explanation of (A).

In Jainism, the mukta jīva is the soul freed from all karmic matter. Free of karma, it regains its natural perfections, the four infinites (ananta catuṣṭaya): infinite perception (darśana), infinite knowledge (jñāna), infinite energy (vīrya) and infinite bliss (sukha).

The four infinites are what mark the released soul as pure, so the reason states exactly why the assertion holds. Options calling either statement false contradict standard Jaina doctrine.

Answer: A

The match is i-d, ii-b, iii-c, iv-a.

In the Yoga tradition (Vyāsa on the Yoga Sūtra) the mind has five levels (bhūmis). Kṣipta is the restless, wild mind dominated by rajas; mūḍha is the dull, ignorant mind dominated by tamas; vikṣipta is the distracted, unsteady mind, occasionally steady; and ekāgra is the one-pointed mind fixed on a single object. The fifth, niruddha, is the fully restrained mind.

Every other code mismatches at least one pair, for example calling kṣipta unsteady or ekāgra wild.