Recent Western Philosophy Questions and Answers

Q: In Nietzsche’s philosophy, terms like ‘Apollonian and Dionysian’ refer to :

Apollonian and Dionysian refer to forces.In The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Nietzsche describes two artistic forces or drives at work in nature and in Greek culture. The Apollonian is the force of order, form, measure and individuation, seen in dream and the plastic arts; the Dionysian is the force of intoxication, ecstasy and the dissolution of the individual, seen in music. Greek tragedy, he argued, was born of their union.Nietzsche took the names from the Greek gods Apollo and Dionysus, which is why 'Greek Gods' and 'Myths' are tempting, but in his philosophy the terms stand for these opposing forces, not for the gods or for mental images.

Q: Heidegger’s term Dasein appropriately refers to :

Dasein refers to being-in-the-world.In Being and Time (1927), Heidegger uses Dasein ('being-there') for the human being as the entity for whom its own being is an issue. Its basic structure is being-in-the-world: Dasein is not a subject set over against objects but is always already involved in a world of things, tasks and other people.Being-in-itself and being-for-itself are Sartre's terms, for things and for consciousness respectively. 'Fundamental being' is not Heidegger's description of Dasein, though his analysis of Dasein serves as fundamental ontology.

Q: According to Moore, Berkeley’s idealism fails to distinguish between :

Moore says Berkeley fails to distinguish consciousness and the object of consciousness.In 'The Refutation of Idealism' (1903), G. E. Moore attacks the principle esse est percipi, to be is to be perceived. He argues that every sensation has two elements: the consciousness, which is common to all sensations, and the object, such as blue or green, which differs. Idealism treats the object as if it were part of the consciousness, so it confuses the sensation of blue with blue itself.The other distinctions, logical and psychological objects, the subject of consciousness, or perceived and imagined objects, are not the point of Moore's argument.

Q: 'Degrees of truth' are maintained by :

Degrees of truth are maintained by Bradley.F. H. Bradley, in Appearance and Reality (1893) and his essays on truth, holds that the Absolute alone is wholly real and true, and every partial judgment is true only to a degree: the more coherent and comprehensive it is, the more truth and reality it has. This is a central doctrine of British absolute idealism.Plato grades levels of being and knowledge in the divided line, but the doctrine of degrees of truth is Bradley's. Aristotle and Kant treat a judgment as simply true or false.

Q: Brain-mind identity theory is put forth by :

The brain-mind identity theory was put forth by J. J. C. Smart.Smart's 'Sensations and Brain Processes' (1959), following U. T. Place, argued that sensations are identical with brain processes, in the way lightning is identical with an electrical discharge: a contingent identity discovered by science.Descartes was a substance dualist, Spinoza held that mind and body are two attributes of one substance (dual-aspect monism), and Ryle in The Concept of Mind defended a logical behaviourism that criticised the 'ghost in the machine' without identifying mind with the brain.

Q: Edmund Gettier's famous paper published in 1963 was entitled :

Gettier's 1963 paper was entitled 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?'.Published in Analysis, the three-page paper gave two counterexamples in which a person has a justified true belief that is true only by luck, and so does not know. It launched the 'Gettier problem' of finding a fourth condition for knowledge.The other titles are invented: the paper's thesis was that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge, but it was posed as a question, and it did not argue that knowledge cannot be defined.

Q: The semantic theory of truth was offered by :

The semantic theory of truth was offered by Tarski.Alfred Tarski, in 'The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages' (1933) and 'The Semantic Conception of Truth' (1944), defined truth for formal languages in a metalanguage, governed by Convention T: 'snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white.Moore and Russell defended versions of the correspondence theory, and Ryle is known for the philosophy of mind and ordinary language, not for a theory of truth.

Q: Name the author of the article 'On Denoting' :

'On Denoting' was written by Russell.Bertrand Russell's article, published in Mind in 1905, set out his theory of descriptions: phrases like 'the present King of France' are not names but are analysed away into quantified statements. It became a paradigm of philosophical analysis.Frege's related paper is 'On Sense and Reference' (1892), which Russell criticises in 'On Denoting'. Quine and Davidson wrote later, building on Russell's theory.

Q: Frege makes a distinction between the following :

Frege distinguishes sense and reference (Sinn and Bedeutung).In 'On Sense and Reference' (1892), Frege notes that 'the Morning Star' and 'the Evening Star' refer to the same object, Venus, yet 'the Morning Star is the Evening Star' is informative while 'the Morning Star is the Morning Star' is not. So an expression has, besides its reference (the object), a sense (its mode of presentation).Truth conditions became central in later semantics, and the sense/nonsense contrast is Wittgenstein's theme in the Tractatus, not Frege's distinction.

Q: Who maintained that language functions not on sentence-to-sentence basis, but as a whole ?

It is Quine who held that language functions as a whole.In 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (1951), Quine argued that our statements about the external world face the tribunal of experience not individually but as a corporate body. Meaning and confirmation belong to the whole system of beliefs, not to single sentences: this is his holism.Frege's context principle makes the sentence the unit of meaning for words, and early Wittgenstein's picture theory treats each elementary proposition as a picture of a possible fact. Russell's atomism likewise analyses sentence by sentence.

In Nietzsche’s philosophy, terms like ‘Apollonian and Dionysian’ refer to :

A.Greek Gods
B.Forces
C.Myths
D.Mental images

Exam Year(s)

MH SET - 2018, SET Exam - 2018,

Answer: B

Apollonian and Dionysian refer to forces.

In The Birth of Tragedy (1872), Nietzsche describes two artistic forces or drives at work in nature and in Greek culture. The Apollonian is the force of order, form, measure and individuation, seen in dream and the plastic arts; the Dionysian is the force of intoxication, ecstasy and the dissolution of the individual, seen in music. Greek tragedy, he argued, was born of their union.

Nietzsche took the names from the Greek gods Apollo and Dionysus, which is why 'Greek Gods' and 'Myths' are tempting, but in his philosophy the terms stand for these opposing forces, not for the gods or for mental images.

Discuss in Forum

Heidegger’s term Dasein appropriately refers to :

A.Fundamental being
B.Being-in-itself
C.Being-in-the-world
D.Being-for-itself

Exam Year(s)

MH SET - 2018, SET Exam - 2018,

Answer: C

Dasein refers to being-in-the-world.

In Being and Time (1927), Heidegger uses Dasein ('being-there') for the human being as the entity for whom its own being is an issue. Its basic structure is being-in-the-world: Dasein is not a subject set over against objects but is always already involved in a world of things, tasks and other people.

Being-in-itself and being-for-itself are Sartre's terms, for things and for consciousness respectively. 'Fundamental being' is not Heidegger's description of Dasein, though his analysis of Dasein serves as fundamental ontology.

Discuss in Forum

According to Moore, Berkeley’s idealism fails to distinguish between :

A.Logical and Psycholgoical object
B.Consciousness and the subject of consciousness
C.Consciousness and the object of consciousness
D.Perceived and imagined object

Exam Year(s)

MH SET - 2018, SET Exam - 2018,

Answer: C

Moore says Berkeley fails to distinguish consciousness and the object of consciousness.

In 'The Refutation of Idealism' (1903), G. E. Moore attacks the principle esse est percipi, to be is to be perceived. He argues that every sensation has two elements: the consciousness, which is common to all sensations, and the object, such as blue or green, which differs. Idealism treats the object as if it were part of the consciousness, so it confuses the sensation of blue with blue itself.

The other distinctions, logical and psychological objects, the subject of consciousness, or perceived and imagined objects, are not the point of Moore's argument.

Discuss in Forum

'Degrees of truth' are maintained by :

A.Plato
B.Aristotle
C.Bradley
D.Kant

Exam Year(s)

MH SET - 2018, SET Exam - 2018,

Answer: C

Degrees of truth are maintained by Bradley.

F. H. Bradley, in Appearance and Reality (1893) and his essays on truth, holds that the Absolute alone is wholly real and true, and every partial judgment is true only to a degree: the more coherent and comprehensive it is, the more truth and reality it has. This is a central doctrine of British absolute idealism.

Plato grades levels of being and knowledge in the divided line, but the doctrine of degrees of truth is Bradley's. Aristotle and Kant treat a judgment as simply true or false.

Discuss in Forum

Brain-mind identity theory is put forth by :

A.Descartes
B.Spinoza
C.Ryle
D.J.J.C. Smart

Exam Year(s)

MH SET - 2018, SET Exam - 2018,

Answer: D

The brain-mind identity theory was put forth by J. J. C. Smart.

Smart's 'Sensations and Brain Processes' (1959), following U. T. Place, argued that sensations are identical with brain processes, in the way lightning is identical with an electrical discharge: a contingent identity discovered by science.

Descartes was a substance dualist, Spinoza held that mind and body are two attributes of one substance (dual-aspect monism), and Ryle in The Concept of Mind defended a logical behaviourism that criticised the 'ghost in the machine' without identifying mind with the brain.

Discuss in Forum

Edmund Gettier's famous paper published in 1963 was entitled :

A.Justified true belief is not knowledge
B.Knowledge cannot be defined
C.Is justified true belief knowledge ?
D.Why is justified true belief knowledge ?

Exam Year(s)

MH SET - 2018, SET Exam - 2018,

Answer: C

Gettier's 1963 paper was entitled 'Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?'.

Published in Analysis, the three-page paper gave two counterexamples in which a person has a justified true belief that is true only by luck, and so does not know. It launched the 'Gettier problem' of finding a fourth condition for knowledge.

The other titles are invented: the paper's thesis was that justified true belief is not sufficient for knowledge, but it was posed as a question, and it did not argue that knowledge cannot be defined.

Discuss in Forum

The semantic theory of truth was offered by :

A.Ryle
B.Moore
C.Tarski
D.Russell

Exam Year(s)

MH SET - 2018, SET Exam - 2018,

Answer: C

The semantic theory of truth was offered by Tarski.

Alfred Tarski, in 'The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages' (1933) and 'The Semantic Conception of Truth' (1944), defined truth for formal languages in a metalanguage, governed by Convention T: 'snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white.

Moore and Russell defended versions of the correspondence theory, and Ryle is known for the philosophy of mind and ordinary language, not for a theory of truth.

Discuss in Forum

Name the author of the article 'On Denoting' :

A.Quine
B.Davidson
C.Russell
D.Frege

Exam Year(s)

MH SET - 2018, SET Exam - 2018,

Answer: C

'On Denoting' was written by Russell.

Bertrand Russell's article, published in Mind in 1905, set out his theory of descriptions: phrases like 'the present King of France' are not names but are analysed away into quantified statements. It became a paradigm of philosophical analysis.

Frege's related paper is 'On Sense and Reference' (1892), which Russell criticises in 'On Denoting'. Quine and Davidson wrote later, building on Russell's theory.

Discuss in Forum

Frege makes a distinction between the following :

A.Sense and truth conditions
B.Truth and truth conditions
C.Sense and nonsense
D.Sense and reference

Exam Year(s)

MH SET - 2018, SET Exam - 2018,

Answer: D

Frege distinguishes sense and reference (Sinn and Bedeutung).

In 'On Sense and Reference' (1892), Frege notes that 'the Morning Star' and 'the Evening Star' refer to the same object, Venus, yet 'the Morning Star is the Evening Star' is informative while 'the Morning Star is the Morning Star' is not. So an expression has, besides its reference (the object), a sense (its mode of presentation).

Truth conditions became central in later semantics, and the sense/nonsense contrast is Wittgenstein's theme in the Tractatus, not Frege's distinction.

Discuss in Forum

10.

Who maintained that language functions not on sentence-to-sentence basis, but as a whole ?

A.Frege
B.Russell
C.Quine
D.Early Wittgenstein

Exam Year(s)

MH SET - 2018, SET Exam - 2018,

Answer: C

It is Quine who held that language functions as a whole.

In 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism' (1951), Quine argued that our statements about the external world face the tribunal of experience not individually but as a corporate body. Meaning and confirmation belong to the whole system of beliefs, not to single sentences: this is his holism.

Frege's context principle makes the sentence the unit of meaning for words, and early Wittgenstein's picture theory treats each elementary proposition as a picture of a possible fact. Russell's atomism likewise analyses sentence by sentence.

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